


228046  
TIR

**Secret**

25X1



# International Narcotics

## STAFF NOTES

DOJ Review Completed.

State Department review completed

**Secret**

202

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

25X1

INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

25 May 1977

CONTENTS

25X6

COLOMBIA: Narcotics Trafficking and the Judicial System . . . . .	3
PERU: Inter-Service Rivalry in Narcotics Control . . . . .	5
NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS:	
1. Pakistan . . . . .	8
2. Caribbean . . . . .	9
NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS:	
1. Malaysia . . . . .	13
2. Singapore . . . . .	14
3. Hong Kong/Macao . . . . .	14
BRIEFS . . . . .	16
INTERESTING READING . . . . .	19

This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

**Page Denied**

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied

25X1

SECRET

25X1

COLOMBIA: Narcotics Trafficking and the Judicial System

According to a recent report in the Bogota press, special protective services for Colombian judges will be provided by the Ministry of Defense. The action is being taken to avoid attacks of the type that have recently cost the lives of several magistrates, particularly those who deal with cases involving narcotics traffickers.

The catalyst for the defense minister's decision was the murder of a judge in Cali earlier this month. The judge, known for his honesty and integrity, was slain by members of a drug group after bribery attempts failed to stave off an adverse ruling against an imprisoned colleague. To make the message even more forceful, the judge was murdered as he was returning to a narcotics seminar for local magistrates that was being visited by the minister of justice.

25X6

numerous drug traffickers  
are arrested and brought to trial.

25X6

In June 1975, the government, acting under state of siege authority, placed narcotics trafficking offenses in the category of major crimes to be tried before military courts. The move was intended primarily to speed up the judicial process

25X6

The judicial process has since been returned to the civil courts, however, and many major traffickers are again able to gain acquittal or release

25X6

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

Officials of the US Drug Enforcement Administration believe that one of the most effective deterrents in Colombia's narcotics control efforts would be the implementation of a strong judicial reform program that would enable honest judges to try traffickers without fear of reprisals. If indeed an effective system of personal protection of judges by the military is being organized, it will constitute a significant step forward in controlling narcotic traffickers in the country. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

PERU: Inter-Service Rivalry in Narcotics Control

Peru's Civil Guard (GC) is challenging the competence of the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) to act as the senior agency in enforcing drug regulations. The Civil Guard's attempt to gain a larger role in narcotics matters could further reduce current mediocre drug enforcement activities and possibly affect recently proposed reorganizational plans designed to halt illicit coca production and to gradually eliminate all coca cultivation in Peru.

25X1

The Civil Guard's maneuvering results in part because the specific duties of each service are not clearly defined in reorganizational proposals. Civil Guard officials insist that they have a role in large cities, where Peruvian Investigations Police offices are located, in addition to their usual duties in towns and rural areas. In mid-April the minister of interior, who has jurisdiction over both organizations, disapproved the Civil Guard's expansion attempts and ruled that the Civil Guard is to restrict its activities to their current jurisdiction. The issue, however, was not settled and the Civil Guard continues to press its claim.

The jurisdictional dispute has been complicated by a recent visit to Peru by an official from the narcotics office of the United Nations who offered to provide the Civil Guard with US\$70,000 to support its drug efforts. He was given a list of needed supplies, including a fully equipped laboratory for use in narcotics work that was requested because Civil Guard officials do not trust the chemists of the Peruvian Investigations Police who currently analyze seized drug materials. The UN official also offered to provide US\$40,000 to the Peruvian Investigations Police; the response, if any, is not known.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

## Principal Areas of Coca Cultivation



621084 377

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

The most serious charges leveled at the PIP's anti-narcotics activities are corruption and lack of prosecution of major traffickers. While the Civil Guard takes the lead in making these accusations, similar charges were made in a series of narcotics-related articles that recently appeared in Lima newspapers. Additionally, the National Coca Enterprise (ENACO), which is charged with controlling licit coca production, was accused of malfeasance. The writers stated that ENACO's role in the key coca-growing regions of Huanuco and Cajamarca is largely decorative and that the organization devotes little effort to its primary duty of enforcing acreage and production allotments. The articles concluded that the repression of drug smuggling could not be allowed to remain solely in the hands of the Peruvian Investigations Police. Rather, they urged that this function be decentralized and expanded to include the Civil Guard.

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

*(Editor's Note: These items, produced for other CIA publications, do not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. They are included here, however, because they concern developing political situations that could impact adversely on the international narcotics control effort.)*

PAKISTAN: Situation Report

25X1

Another effort to resolve the 10-week-old political crisis in Pakistan is under way, apparently at the urging of Saudi Arabia and possibly other Muslim states. Last week, Prime Minister Bhutto released Abdul Qayyum Khan--the leader of one of the nine parties in the opposition alliance--from prison so that he could meet with the leaders of the other parties, all but one of whom are still in jail.

Qayyum Khan, after meetings with his colleagues and Bhutto has appeared optimistic about the chances for a peaceful solution to the crisis. The opposition was expected to make a formal reply to Bhutto on May 26, after Qayyum had seen all of the opposition leaders.

Public statements by the acting head of the opposition alliance have implied that little if any progress is likely, and Qayyum Khan's optimism about a solution may be misplaced. Several other recent initiatives have foundered on irreconcilable demands. The most immediate problem facing those trying to end the crisis is to obtain agreement by all nine opposition leaders to a unified position on negotiations. One of the principal hurdles has been disagreement within the group on a formula to allow Bhutto to remain in office, at least temporarily, while restricting his power to control the government.

According to Qayyum, Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries have brought pressure on both Bhutto and the opposition to reach a settlement. The opposition press reports that King Khalid sent special messages to both sides.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

The crisis erupted following the election in March; Bhutto's party won handily, but the opposition claimed the election was rigged. Bhutto has refused thus far to accede to the principal demands of his opponents that he resign and that a new election be held under army or judiciary supervision. He has indicated a reluctant willingness to consider an election but has refused to step down.

On May 13, Bhutto announced plans for a national referendum to decide if he should remain as prime minister. The opposition rejected that proposal.

25X1

EASTERN CARIBBEAN: Radical  
Leaders Emerging

25X1

Marxist-oriented radicals are making a strong push for power on islands in the eastern Caribbean. The challengers, many of whom were active in the Caribbean black power movement a decade ago, are increasingly turning to conventional election politics as the most promising route to leadership. Any success the radicals have will probably mean an increase in Cuban influence.

The new radical leaders have adopted various strategies. Some are working within traditional parties. Others have formed broadly based alliances in hopes of defeating a well-entrenched leader. These and similar tactics have already enabled several radical groups to take control of the opposition and could allow others to develop as major contenders for power in the years ahead.


On Barbados, a group of Marxist university activists led by Ralph Gonzalves has joined with young regulars of the opposition party in an attempt to steer the party to the left. Gonzalves, an electrifying speaker and accomplished political organizer, is still a long way from translating stump oratory into leadership, but he has acquired a respectable podium for delivering his ideological message.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

## The Eastern Caribbean



621597 77

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

On St. Lucia, which is not yet independent of the UK, a dynamic Marxist politician, George Odlum, has worked his way up to a position of influence in the major opposition party. Odlum's brand of socialism has met with broad support in the party, and only last-minute maneuvering kept him from becoming party leader early this year. He remains second in the hierarchy and is generally conceded a strong chance of eventually assuming power.

On Grenada, the Marxist-oriented New Jewel Movement joined forces with two centrist parties last year to try to defeat the durable but eccentric Prime Minister Eric Gairy. The coalition was narrowly defeated in the December election, but it still maintains an outside chance of replacing Gairy in the near future.

On Antigua, Tim Hector, leader of the Afro-Caribbean Liberation Movement, reportedly plans to seek election to the Antiguan House of Assembly.

On Dominica, Roosevelt Douglas, a long-time activist and a stalking horse for Cuba in the eastern Caribbean, has ingratiated himself with Premier Patrick John in hopes of steering him on a leftward course.

The Cuban government stands to gain from the strengthened position of the radicals in the eastern Caribbean. Many of the emerging leaders have been impressed by visits to Cuba or influenced by contact with Cuban officials in third countries such as Jamaica or Guyana.

In some cases, Havana may have actually helped persuade the leftists that participation in conventional politics is the best course to follow. Encouraging local leaders to use established parties or "progressive" coalitions as vehicles to power would be in line with Cuban policy in the Caribbean. This has been reinforced by the Jamaican experience, in which young radicals have succeeded in gaining a strong position within the ruling party and considerable influence over Prime Minister Manley.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

Local circumstances have pushed Caribbean politics leftward in recent years and are likely to continue to do so. Limited resources and worsening economic conditions combined with populations that have large percentages of young people have significantly improved the prospects for the left. By joining established parties, the radical politicians have had to tone down their rhetoric, but they have also gained a stamp of legitimacy which they can use in their drive for power.

25X1

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

MALAYSIA

Significance: Malaysia's role in international narcotics trafficking in the past three years has increased so that it now serves as a major departure and transit point for much of the illicit narcotics reaching European markets. There is no tangible evidence that Malaysia is a cultivator of opium. There have been, however, four narcotics refineries raided and closed in northern Malaysia over the past three years with some evidence that others continue to function.

The bulk of international trafficking is controlled by several organizations consisting primarily of ethnic Chinese in the Penang-Alor area. The flow of narcotics is from the poppy fields of Burma to refineries on the Thai-Burma border, and then south through the Malay Peninsula where it is smuggled by courier to international markets. An indicator of Malaysia's role in trafficking is the official admission that 370 Malaysians have been arrested overseas in the past two years for narcotics trafficking. There is also a domestic narcotics abuse program--10,436 kilos of opium and derivatives, including 196 kilos of heroin, have been seized since 1970.

Problem: The government of Malaysia is aware of the scope of its narcotics problem, and some control measures, have achieved minor successes. Most of the measures, however, have been focused primarily on the domestic problem rather than on the international aspects of the narcotics issue. Laws have been passed to deal harshly with drug abusers. There is a tendency, however, to regard the Communist insurgents as the primary factor in the international aspects of the problem. Although there is some evidence that the insurgents have been involved in narcotics smuggling through Malaysia, there is little evidence of any connection with international trafficking organizations. The unrest in the border areas resulting from the insurgent groups located there increases the difficulty of controlling the movement of illicit narcotics through the region.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

Prospects: In the immediate future, the momentum established by the traffickers will be maintained. Progress against international trafficking must include an awareness by the government that the narcotics trafficking problem extends far beyond the insurgents. There must also be more stringent prosecution of the offenders, and a more concerted effort to control smuggling at major points of international travel. [REDACTED]

25X1

#### SINGAPORE

Significance: From all evidence, Singapore does not play a major role in the actual movement of narcotics to international markets. Unquestionably, some narcotics must move through Singapore, but the bulk of narcotics smuggled into Singapore is for local consumption. Singaporeans, however, figure heavily in international trafficking schemes. Many are couriers, much as is the case of Malaysians, and many of them are arrested annually in Europe (most of the couriers pick up the narcotics in Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Penang, and do not begin their courier duties in Singapore). The significant role is played by Singaporean financiers. Several narcotics operations have been traced to financial backing by Singapore residents.

Problem: Uncovering and prosecuting financiers, who exercise great care in concealing their role in narcotics trafficking, is the primary problem. The law in Singapore is more than sufficient to cope with normal patterns of trafficking; prosecutions over the past several months resulted in a number of death sentences. The penalized have been generally of a very low level--small-time couriers, peddlers, and abusers. The government is cooperating with other nations, but the "multilayered" financiers continue to avoid detection and arrest. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

#### HONG KONG/MACAO

Significance: Hong Kong is primarily a consumer area, but undoubtedly also serves as a conduit for narcotics being smuggled into the US and Europe. It also is a source of financing--similar to Singapore--for multinational smuggling operations. Increased awareness of

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

its narcotics role; sustained vigilance by enforcement agencies, cooperation with other governments, and less government corruption have lowered the level of trafficking through Hong Kong over the past few years.

Problem: Hong Kong's relatively minor role in international trafficking in narcotics may be only temporary. If eradication programs in Mexico attain any substantial degree of success, an increase of Asian heroin on the US market probably will develop with traffickers taking advantage of Hong Kong's links to the West Coast--through ethnic Chinese community ties and the burgeoning commercial traffic. The outstanding problem, similar to that of Singapore, is that Hong Kong also serves as a source of financial support for narcotics trafficking. Hong Kong sources are already giving financial support to profitable operations to Europe, the US, and Canada through ethnic Chinese communities.

Prospects: Any lessening of the intensity of Hong Kong's operations against narcotics trafficking or any acceleration in the activities of the traffickers could result in Hong Kong regaining a major role in international narcotics trafficking.

Macao is not addressed separately in this assessment since it can be considered a reflection of the situation in Hong Kong. Frequently, narcotics are transported through Macao to Hong Kong. Similarly, if anti-narcotics efforts in Hong Kong increase in risk, Hong Kong traffickers shift their operations temporarily to Macao. Independent of Hong Kong, Macao does not have a significant role in international narcotics trafficking.

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

BRIEFS

25X6

GUYANA: Expressing his concern over the current drug problems in Guyana, Cecil Roberts, the assistant superintendent of the Guyanese police, said that marijuana trafficking in Guyana is on the rise and that the local police are not equipped or trained to handle the present drug problem. According to Roberts, Guyana needs trained drug-sniffing dogs and dog handlers to uncover narcotics being smuggled into Guyana and/or being transferred through Guyana at its two primary ports of entry--Timehri airport and Georgetown harbor. Roberts confided to US embassy officials that the Guyana police department presently has only three officers who have had training in narcotics work. Reportedly, the "highest levels of government," perhaps including Minister Forbes Burnham, have agreed to cooperate fully with DEA initiatives in developing a drug enforcement program in Guyana. [REDACTED]

25X1

AFGHANISTAN: On 24 May, local anti-smuggling forces, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] seized over 800 kilograms of raw opium. The opium was reportedly being transported in a truck registered in Kabul and was neatly packaged in machine-sewn cloth bags protected by machine-sewn plastic bags. [REDACTED]

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

TURKEY: The Turkish government recently invited General Farag, chief of the Egyptian Anti-Narcotics Administration (ANA), to visit Ankara for discussions with Turkish anti-narcotics officials. This is the first such contact in recent years, and was prompted by the seizure last June of about 200 kilograms of raw opium from a boat that sank off the Egyptian coast during an apparent smuggling attempt. A Turkish national was apprehended, and a Turkish ship apparently was involved in bringing the shipment to the vicinity of the Egyptian coast. Although the raw opium was originally assumed to be Turkish, laboratory analysis indicated that it was not of Turkish origin, but it apparently did transit Turkey on the way to Egypt. Intermittent investigation of the case has been going on for about a year. After much prodding, Turkish and Egyptian officials apparently have overcome traditional coolness enough to make direct official contact possible on the narcotics case. The Turks have made some low-level contact in Cairo, but this meeting of officials in Ankara constitutes the first real step toward possible closer cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in the international narcotics control effort. [REDACTED]

25X1

NORWAY: Foreign Minister Frydenlund, in his foreign policy statement to Parliament on 20 May, drew attention to the government's strong interest in the international narcotics problem and to government plans to devote development-aid funds to the problem. He further said the government will strive to get other industrial states to participate and will discuss the matter with the other Nordic countries as well as in the Council of Europe Ministerial Committee. [REDACTED]

25X1

IRAN: The Iranian government is taking steps to bolster its narcotics control effort. A new drug abuse control organization, which will have an independent inspectorate and a cooperative relationship with the police, has received ministerial approval. The gendarmerie and police anti-narcotics units are also being expanded. The police involved in the drug control effort are being increased thirty-five percent. There is growing concern in Iran over increased opium poppy cultivation in neighboring

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

Afghanistan. Tehran has already made at least one demarche to the Kabul government and reportedly is considering another. [REDACTED]

25X1

**BULGARIA-LAOS:** The Bulgarian government is considering the purchase of three tons of raw opium from Laos. Both governments have sought unofficial UN approval for such a transaction before making formal application to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), as required under the terms of the 1961 Single Convention. There is concern in UN circles that, if an application is made and turned down by the INCB, it could jeopardize the continuation of the UNFDAC office in Vientiane. [REDACTED]

25X1

**BURMA:** Burmese press articles, apparently inspired by the Burmese government, have called for Thai-Burmese cooperation in suppressing the Golden Triangle drug traffic. The series of articles, which require government approval, chided the Thai government for "past failures and shortcomings" in narcotics control, but praised recent control efforts and urged greater bilateral cooperation in the narcotics suppression effort. Embassy representatives in Rangoon view the press campaign as a clear effort by the Burmese to encourage the Thai government to join in a cooperative effort against the "insurgent" groups that are deeply involved in narcotics trafficking along the Thai-Burmese border. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

INTERESTING READING

*Deputy Law Minister: Need For Global Laws on Drugs*  
(MALAYSIA)--TNDD,\* No. 299, May 11, 1977, pp. 10-11.

*Growing Involvement of Asian Communists in Drug Trade*  
(MALAYSIA)--TNDD, No. 299, pp. 13-14.

*Southeast Asia's Drug Problem* (NEW ZEALAND)--TNDD, No. 299, pp. 21-27. (We estimate, however, that the current opium production in Burma, Laos, and Thailand is closer to 500 tons than the 700 ton total noted in the Garnier article.)

*Narcotics Control Board To Get 200-Member Permanent Staff*  
(THAILAND)--TNDD, No. 299, p. 38.

*Police Get Grip on Amsterdam Heroin Market* (NETHERLANDS)--TNDD, No. 299, pp. 74-77.

*Preventive Program to Counter Heroin Addiction Outlined*  
(SWEDEN)--TNDD, No. 299, pp. 77-84.

*Joint Nordic Policy Suggested to Counter Drug Abuse*  
(SWEDEN)--TNDD, No. 299, p. 92.

*FRG Drug Dealer's Operations, Distribution Described*  
(WEST GERMANY)--TNDD, No. 299, pp. 93-95.

*Achievements of Bulgarian Customs Officers Against Drug Smugglers* (BULGARIA)--TNDD, No. 300, May 19, 1977, pp. 29-32.

*Plate River Basin Once Was World Drug Center* (ARGENTINA)--TNDD, No. 300, pp. 33-35.

*Porto Segura Seen as New Entry Point for Drugs From East*  
(BRAZIL)--TNDD, No. 300, pp. 46-50.

25X1

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

SECRET

*Drug Problem in Basel Worsening* (SWITZERLAND)--TNDD, No. 300, pp. 118-120.

*Indian Police Smash International Drug Syndicate* (INDIA)--TNDD, No. 301, May 23, 1977, pp. 7-8.

*Narcotics Smuggling Ring Thwarted* (EGYPT)--TNDD, No. 301, pp. 51-60.

*Cyprus Reportedly Transit Center for Drugs-Weapons Smuggling* (CYPRUS)--TNDD, No. 301, p. 62.

*Record Quantity of LSD Seized in Rome* (ITALY)--TNDD, No. 301, pp. 64-65.

PS SNIN 77-011  
25 May 1977

SECRET

**Secret**

**Secret**